The Ultimatum

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto has issued his clearest warning yet to Washington: if Donald Trump's Board of Peace does not deliver tangible benefits for Palestinians, Indonesia will walk away.

The statement, released through the government communication office on March 6, marks a significant shift in tone from Jakarta. Just weeks ago, Prabowo was positioning Indonesia as a key partner in the US-backed Gaza stabilization force. Now, with the US-Israeli war on Iran entering its second week and the broader Middle East spiraling into chaos, Indonesia's involvement has become a domestic political liability.

Domestic Pressure Mounts

Prabowo's conditional threat came after a meeting with leaders of major Indonesian Islamic organizations on the evening of March 5. The gathering was part damage control, part strategic recalibration.

The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), the country's most influential clerical body, had already called for a complete withdrawal from the Board of Peace, citing the US role in the Iran war as fundamentally incompatible with Indonesia's long-standing support for Palestinian self-determination.

Hanif Alatas of the Islamic Brotherhood Front, who attended the meeting, conveyed Prabowo's position directly: "The president said that if he sees that there is no longer any benefit for Palestine... and that it is not in line with Indonesia's national interests, he will withdraw."

The pressure is not just from religious leaders. Indonesian students have also taken to the streets, urging Prabowo to reassess the country's participation. An International Relations lecturer at the University of Indonesia framed the protests as reflecting Indonesia's founding anti-colonial principles — a politically potent argument in a nation that sees its 1945 independence struggle as its defining narrative.

The Gaza Stabilization Force in Limbo

The Board of Peace was supposed to oversee the creation of an international stabilization force (ISF) for Gaza, authorized by the UN Security Council. Indonesia was not just a participant — it was a leading contributor. The US commander of the force had announced last month that his deputy would be Indonesian, a symbolic and operational recognition of Jakarta's commitment.

But the Iran war has upended the timeline. Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono confirmed on March 3 that all discussions about the Board of Peace had been halted. A Trump administration official acknowledged to Reuters that "some ISF deployment timelines may shift due to the situation on the ground," while insisting that discussions with Indonesian partners continue.

The reality is bleaker than the diplomatic language suggests. With Hormuz under effective blockade, Gulf states under Iranian missile fire, and the entire Middle Eastern security architecture in flux, deploying a stabilization force to Gaza is logistically and politically untenable in the near term.

The Nahdlatul Ulama Gambit

Not all of Indonesia's major Muslim organizations are calling for a clean break. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country's largest Muslim organization with tens of millions of members, has proposed a more nuanced approach.

NU chief Yahya Cholil Staquf suggested that Indonesia could use its seat on the Board of Peace as leverage, declaring the agenda on hold "until there are talks on de-escalation and peace from the American-Israeli war against Iran." This approach would keep Indonesia at the table while distancing it from the war — a classic diplomatic hedge.

The NU position gives Prabowo political cover to delay rather than withdraw outright, preserving the relationship with Washington while satisfying domestic critics. It is arguably the most strategically sophisticated option available.

What This Means for Indonesia's Foreign Policy

Prabowo's balancing act reflects a fundamental tension in Indonesian foreign policy. The country's "free and active" (bebas aktif) doctrine, enshrined since independence, commits Indonesia to non-alignment. Joining a US-led peace board was already a departure from that tradition. Staying on while the US wages war on a Muslim-majority nation would be a far more dramatic break.

At the same time, Indonesia has deep strategic interests in maintaining good relations with Washington. The US is a major trading partner, a source of military equipment, and a counterbalance to China's growing influence in Southeast Asia. Walking away from the Board of Peace could carry costs that extend well beyond Gaza.

Prabowo's conditional framing — "if it does not benefit Palestine" — is deliberately ambiguous. It sets a standard that can be interpreted flexibly, allowing him to stay or go depending on how the Iran war evolves and whether the US can offer meaningful concessions on Palestinian statehood.

The Bigger Picture

Indonesia's dilemma is shared by virtually every Muslim-majority nation that signed onto Trump's Middle East peace architecture. The Iran war has not just disrupted shipping lanes and oil markets — it has shattered the diplomatic framework that was supposed to deliver stability to Gaza and the broader region.

For Indonesia, the stakes are particularly high. The country has 58,000 citizens stranded in Saudi Arabia due to war-related flight disruptions. Its military has deployed troops to guard foreign embassies in Jakarta amid heightened tensions. And the IHSG has plunged nearly 8% in a week, partly driven by the geopolitical turmoil.

Prabowo's ultimatum is a recognition that Indonesia cannot remain a silent partner in a peace process that has been overtaken by war. Whether he follows through will depend on the coming weeks — and on whether Washington can offer Jakarta something more than a seat at a table that no one is sitting at.